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COUNTERFEIT PHARMACEUTICALS IN CHINA:
COULD CHANGES BRING STRONGER PROTECTION
FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
HUMAN HEALTH?
Dina M. Bronshtein†
Abstract: Although China seeks to improve its image as a legitimate participant in
the global intellectual property (“IP”) market, Chinese companies continue to produce
more than thirty percent of the counterfeit drugs circulating in the world today. The
counterfeit pharmaceutical industry profits from efficient and cost-effective production
systems by producing counterfeits at an exceedingly low cost. This poses a serious
problem because the production and sale of counterfeit drugs leads to negative economic
and social health-related effects.
China’s existing penalties for counterfeit
pharmaceutical production are considered a mere cost of doing business in China, rather
than a deterrent from engaging in counterfeiting. China’s national government has taken
several steps to fight against IP infringement, but despite this effort, the growing power
and autonomy of local governments has complicated and exacerbated the problem.
In order to become a legitimate and reputable force in the international economy,
China must take greater steps to limit the production and sale of counterfeit
pharmaceuticals. First, China must amend its laws to include penalties that will
effectively deter actors from entering the counterfeit market. Second, China must
allocate a significant amount of resources to the judicial system to ensure that
adjudication is effective and efficient. Third, China must fight localized corruption at its
source to increase enforcement of IP rights. Specifically, an agency should be created to
target local corruption and to disestablish the counterfeit pharmaceutical market. This
agency should have investigative and auditing power and should work to educate both the
public and the business community on the problems posed by counterfeit pharmaceuticals
and the means used to counter them.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The World Health Organization (“WHO”) defines a counterfeit drug
as “a medicine, which is deliberately and fraudulently mislabeled with
respect to identity and/or source.”1 China is one of the world’s top
producers of both legitimate and counterfeit pharmaceuticals.2 In 1980,
China took initial significant steps to improve its IP climate when it joined

†
Juris Doctor expected 2009, University of Washington School of Law. The author would like to
thank the editors of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal.
1
INT’L FED’N OF PHARM. MFRS. & ASSOC., COUNTERFEIT MEDICINES: AN UPDATE ON ESTIMATES 1
(2006), http://www.ifpma.org/Issues/fileadmin/templates/ifpmaissues/pdfs/IMPACT_counterfeit_estimate
_15Nov06.pdf.
2
See Maria Nelson et al., Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals: A Worldwide Problem, 96 TRADEMARK
REP. 1068, 1089 (2006).
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the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”).3 Since this
important development, China has adopted and amended its IP law, signed
several treaties, and joined international organizations to work towards
establishing a “made by China” label, rather than remaining with the “made
in China” label.4 These changes have led to fast-paced growth of intellectual
property activity.5 In fact, according to a WIPO report, China has become
the third largest recipient of patent filings with a filing increase of almost
thirty-three percent in 2004 alone.6 Although these numbers seem
promising, China’s prominent role in the counterfeit drug market reveals its
ongoing inability to enforce IP rights or to prosecute infringement through
administrative, civil, or criminal mechanisms.7
Worldwide, the counterfeit drug market accounts for approximately
forty billion dollars in annual sales.8 China is a lead actor in this market, and
its role will arguably only increase in the future.9 Although there are
significant profits that can be earned from participation in the counterfeit
drug market, counterfeiting also results in physical harm or death to
thousands of people globally,10 as well as decreased confidence in the
Chinese economy and stifled innovation.11 The Chinese government could
arguably approach this problem head-on by amending legislation and
increasing enforcement efforts. Additionally, it could work to eliminate the
local government corruption that undermines existing counterfeit drug
regulations.12
This comment discusses the issues revolving around China’s
counterfeit drug industry and provides suggestions as to how the Chinese
3
Permanent Mission of P.R.C. to the U.N. Office at Geneva and Other Int’l Orgs. in Switz., The
Cooperation Between China and the World Intellectual Property Organization (Apr. 19, 2004),
http://www.china-un.ch/eng/zmjg/jgjblc/t85562.htm.
4
See Jayanthi Iyengar, Intellectual Property Piracy Rocks China Boat, ASIA TIMES, Sept. 16, 2004,
available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/FI16Ad07.html; see also Nelson et al., supra note 2, at
1089.
5
See generally HUAIWEN HE & PING ZHANG, IMPACT OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEM ON
ECONOMIC GROWTH, COUNTRY REPORT-CHINA, http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/studies/pdf/wipo_unu_
07_china.pdf (last visited Feb.8, 2008) (discussing development of Chinese IP System).
6
World Intellectual Property Organization [hereinafter WIPO], WIPO Patent Report: Statistics on
Worldwide Patent Activities, at 10 (2007), available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/
freepublications/en/patents/931/wipo_pub_931.pdf.
7
U.S. Dep’t. of Comm. Int. Trade Admin., IPR Toolkit: Protecting Your Intellectual Property
Rights (IPR) in China (Dec. 2005), http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/protecting_ipr.html.
8
Ying Huang, AstraZeneca Adopts Digital Security to Deter Chinese Counterfeiting, PHARMAASIA
NEWS, Sept. 5, 2007, http://fdcalerts.typepad.com/asia/2007/09/astrazeneca-ado.html.
9
See Peggy B. Hu & Berta Gomez, Public Safety Jeopardized by Chinese Counterfeiters, Experts
Say (May 20, 2005), http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2005/May/20-45620.html.
10
Id.
11
See Iyengar, supra note 4.
12
See Nelson et al., supra note 2, at 1089.
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government can better address this problem. Part II discusses the serious
health threats posed by counterfeit drugs, introduces a prominent example of
drug counterfeiting, and presents the steps China has already taken to fight
against IP infringement. Part III describes the body of Chinese law created
to confront IP infringement and fight against counterfeiting. Part IV
addresses the legal mechanisms used to enforce these IP laws and discusses
specific issues that hinder deterrence of pharmaceutical counterfeiting.
Finally, Part V suggests possible means by which the Chinese government
could improve enforcement of IP laws in order to reduce China’s production
and sale of counterfeit drugs.
II.

BACKGROUND ON PHARMACEUTICAL COUNTERFEITING

Countries around the world have communicated their strong
opposition to drug counterfeiting, despite the fact that counterfeiting has the
ability to yield high economic gains for those who do business in the
industry.13 The rise of counterfeit drugs has caused a decrease in innovation
and investment in legitimate pharmaceutical companies. It has also caused a
wide array of social and economic problems for China.14
A.

Pharmaceutical Counterfeiting Causes Serious Physical and
Economic Harm

According to WHO, counterfeit drugs account for ten percent of the
world’s pharmaceuticals, though this number may be as high as sixty percent
in some developing countries.15
Counterfeit drugs will be worth
approximately seventy-five billion dollars globally by 2010.16 Due to
China’s significant contribution to this mass production, the United States
has placed China on its “priority watch list”17 of countries failing to protect
IP rights adequately and reduce infringement levels significantly.18
13

See Jim Hilboldt, Counterfeit Medicines Outside the United States: Challenges and Responses, in
PHARMACEUTICAL LAW 2006: ACROSS THE PRODUCTION LIFE CYCLE 869, 874 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, & Literary Property, Course Handbook Series, 2006).
14
See Nelson et al., supra note 2, at 1072.
15
See U.S. Chamber of Commerce View on China’s Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights and
The Dangers of the Movement of Counterfeited and Pirated Goods into the U.N., Testimony Before the
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (June 7, 2006) [hereinafter U.S. Chamber of
Commerce] (statement of Myron Brilliant, Vice-President, East Asia U.S. Chamber of Commerce,),
available at http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2006hearings/written_testimonies/06_06_07wrts/06_06_7_8_
brilliant_myron.php.
16
WHO, Counterfeit Medicines (Nov. 14, 2006), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/
fs275/en/.
17
The United States places countries that have failed to meet its IP protection standards on a
“priority watch list.” See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SPECIAL 301 REPORT: EXECUTIVE
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The counterfeit pharmaceuticals market presents a serious health risk
to both Chinese citizens and to the international community. This growing
problem is due to the fact that approximately fifty percent of China’s drug
supply is counterfeit.19 According to Shenzhen Evening News, a Chinese
government-run news station, approximately 192,000 people died in China
in 2001 due to consumption of counterfeit drugs.20 In considering this
figure, it is important to remember that although this may not seem
significant in comparison to China’s population of over one billion, the
actual death toll is likely to be much higher than the reported number.21
Counterfeit drugs cause fatalities through both immediate and latent
effects.22 For example, some counterfeits can accelerate the growth of drugresistant virus strains.23 This occurs when the counterfeit contains too little
of the necessary active ingredients making up the legitimate drug and,
therefore, does not kill all the disease agents, causing the strains to spread.24
This problem is especially evident in developing countries that lack the
resources and political will to fight against counterfeiting; residents of such
countries are often those that need the most legitimate medical attention.25
The detrimental economic effects of pharmaceutical counterfeiting
reach beyond the borders of the source country.26 Producers of counterfeit
SUMMARY 18-19 (2007), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2006/2006_
Special_301_Review/asset_upload_file473_9336.pdf [hereinafter SPECIAL 301 REPORT]. The Special 301
Report is released annually by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. It reports on the adequacy and
effectiveness of intellectual property (“IP”) rights protection of U.S. trading partners. See BeSpacific,
USTR’s 2007 Special 301 Report (Apr. 30, 2007), http://www.bespacific.com/mt/archives/014712.html.
18
See U.S. Dept. of State, China Has High Rate of Intellectual Property Infringement (Apr. 29,
2005), http://usinfo.state.gov/usinfo/Archive/2005/Apr/29-580129.html.
19
Amy Reeves, Clamping Down on Counterfeit Drugs; Billions Are at Stake: FDA, Drug Makers
Move to Reduce the Number of Fakes That Hit the Market, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Oct. 20, 2003, at A9.
20
Todd Datz, Faked in China, CSOONLINE.COM, Jan. 1, 2006, http://www.csoonline.com/
read/010106/faked_china.html. See also GRAHAM SATCHWELL, A SICK BUSINESS: COUNTERFEIT
MEDICINES AND ORGANISED CRIME 44 (2004),
available at http://www.stockholm-network.org/
downloads/publications/2b74e489-Sick%20Business.pdf. In fact, it has been estimated that there is on
average between 200,000 and 300,000 reported deaths in China each year due to counterfeit or substandard
medicine. See Peter Pitts, President, Ctr. for Med. in the Pub. Interest, Testimony: Counterfeit Drugs and
China (May 31, 2006), http://www.cmpi.org/TestimonialsDetail.asp?contentdetailid=99&contenttypeid=
8&page=1.
21
See Pitts, supra note 20.
22
See Lisa Lerer, Bitter Pills: Counterfeit Drugs Manufactured in China Are Landing in Some of the
Poorest Areas in the World, Killing Those Most Desperate for Medical Attention, IP LAW & BUS., Dec. 1,
2006, at 32.
23
Id.
24
Id. For example, WHO and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control believe that substandard or
ineffective medicines have contributed to the emergence of drug-resistant strains of cholera, salmonella,
tuberculosis and other diseases. See Hu & Gomez, supra note 9.
25
See Hu & Gomez, supra note 9, at 1-2.
26
See Nelson et al., supra note 2, at 1072.
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drugs do not comply with safety regulations and do not pay taxes on their
goods.27 This reduces government revenue because legitimate drug
producers are less likely to enter the market and thus pay taxes if that market
is highly saturated with counterfeits.28 Additionally, the counterfeit drug
market stifles investment and innovation.29 The cost of investigating and
prosecuting infringers is expensive for both companies and the
government.30 In countries where counterfeiting is widespread, it can cost
millions of dollars annually to track down infringers and pay the litigation
costs associated with prosecuting them.31 Often, even if a company prevails
in litigation, the financial results are far from cost-effective.32 These
expenses will likely deter new companies from entering the pharmaceutical
market and existing companies from investing in innovative efforts that
could lead to life-saving discoveries. This results in stifled pharmaceutical
innovation, which harms both economies and public welfare globally.
China’s efforts to avoid such harm and legitimize its IP market are
evident in the struggles faced by Pfizer Pharmaceuticals (“Pfizer”) in China.
Moreover, Pfizer’s effort to protect its IP rights (“IPR”) illustrates the
difficulty of obtaining IP protection in China and China’s efforts made to
become a respected member of the international IP community.
B.

The Pfizer Pharmaceuticals Case Reveals the Magnitude of the
Counterfeiting Problem and China’s Effort to Develop IP Enforcement

In recent years, several cases have demonstrated overall improvement
in China’s IPR enforcement regime. The Pfizer case, which involved several
Chinese companies’ attempts to enforce what they claimed to be their IPR
against Pfizer, illustrates such improvement and the resulting increased
confidence in Chinese enforcement of IPR within the international
community.
The Chinese State Drug Administration approved the use of Pfizer’s
drug Viagra in China on July 2, 2000.33 At the time, however, China’s State
Intellectual Property Office (“SIPO”) had not yet granted Pfizer a patent for

27

Id.
Jamie Miyazaki, Faking It Gucci Style, ASIA TIMES, Feb. 6 2004, available at
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Global_Economy/FB06Dj01.html.
29
See Nelson et al., supra note 2, at 1072.
30
See U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 15, at 3.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
See Jeffrey A. Andrews, Pfizer’s Viagra Patent and the Promise of Patent Protection in China, 28
LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 10 (2006).
28
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sildenafil citrate, the active ingredient in Viagra.34 In China, access to
Viagra was available by prescription from senior physicians only, and
distribution was confined to hospital pharmacies.35
In May 2000, the promise for potential growth of China’s Viagra
market immediately attracted the interest of counterfeit producers. At this
time a Chinese pharmaceutical company began illegally manufacturing
sildenafil citrate.36 This company relied upon Pfizer’s SIPO disclosures to
obtain information about Viagra’s active ingredient and to seek to obtain a
patent for this ingredient itself.37 This led to a vast increase in the sale of
Viagra in sex shops, airports, and pharmacies all over China.38 In fact, just
six months after Pfizer introduced Viagra to the Chinese market, an
estimated ninety percent of Viagra pills sold in Shanghai were counterfeit.39
Such counterfeit distribution caused Pfizer to experience significant market
pressure.40 Pfizer subsequently took steps to combat these counterfeit sales.
However, it was not until September 19, 2001, when SIPO issued Pfizer a
patent for the active ingredient in Viagra,41 that legal action commenced
against the widespread counterfeiting. At that time, a group of twelve
Chinese drug companies petitioned the Patent Reexamination Board to
invalidate Pfizer’s patent, leading to a series of IP infringement trials.42
Such actions signaled an important change in Chinese IP enforcement.
Until this time, the Chinese producers and sellers of pharmaceuticals dealt
with similar situations by engaging in counterfeit activities instead of turning
to legal proceedings.43 Specifically, if there was a conflict regarding IPR,
instead of trying to enforce what they believed to be their patent or
trademark, such parties often allowed the opposing party to obtain all legal
rights and then engaged in infringement by producing and selling the given
drug as a counterfeit. Petitioning to the Patent Reexamination Board was a
new approach to competing with foreign products.44 This change was

34

Id.
See Shi Pengyun, Viagra No Longer Hard to Get, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 7, 2002, available at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2002-02/07/content_105885.htm.
36
See Andrews, supra note 33, at 10.
37
Id. at 10-11.
38
Id. at 11.
39
Elaine Kurtenbach, China Court Upholds Pfizer’s Viagra Patent, CBSNEWS.COM, June 5, 2006,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/06/05/ap/business/mainD8I1U0UO0.shtml.
40
See Andrews, supra note 33, at 11.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
See id. at 12.
44
See id.
35
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further demonstrated by the decision of the Chinese patent review board,45
which decided to uphold Pfizer’s patent rights for Viagra.46
Similarly, in 2005, Pfizer also successfully fought to protect another
drug, Lipitor, from Chinese counterfeiters.47 Three Chinese businesses and
eleven Chinese individuals were indicted for their involvement in a fortytwo million dollar conspiracy to sell counterfeit Lipitor.48 As part of this
effort, the Food and Drug Administration in the United States recalled over
eighteen million Lipitor tablets.49 This enormous recall was due to the
significant problem associated with deciphering counterfeit drugs from
legitimate ones once they were released into the public market.50
In response to these reoccurring cases, Pfizer, with the help of the
Chinese government, made several efforts to address the counterfeiting
problem in China. For example, Pfizer opened a testing facility in Dalian,
China51 and formed an alliance with the Shanghai Municipal Food and Drug
Administration to detect and stop counterfeiting.52 Pfizer also signed two
agreements with the Chinese state government. These agreements laid out
the parties’ joint efforts to fight against the production of counterfeit drugs
through the use of investigation and drug testing.53 Through this initiative,
Chinese officials recovered 600,000 counterfeit Viagra labels and packaging,
440,000 counterfeit Viagra tablets, and 260 kilograms of raw materials used
to manufacture counterfeit drugs.54 Also, in 2001, the Chinese government
closed down 1300 companies for counterfeiting, while investigating 480,000
cases of counterfeit drugs worth a combined total of fifty-seven million
dollars.55 Furthermore, the Chinese State Food and Drug Administration
announced that it had banned 114,000 unlicensed drug manufacturers and

45

In 2004, the Reexamination Board held that the technical openness of the patent specification was
incompatible with Pfizer’s claim to rights and Pfizer lost at the administrative level; however this decision
was overturned. Id.
46
See Nelson et al., supra note 2, at 1093.
47
Problem of Counterfeit Drugs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy,
and Human Resources of H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Randall W. Lutter,
Acting Assoc. Comm’r for Policy and Planning, Food and Drug Administration).
48
Id.
49
See Hilboldt, supra note 13, at 888.
50
See Nelson et al., supra note 2, at 1070.
51
See Omario Kanji, Note, Paper Dragon: Inadequate Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in
China, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1261, 1268 (2006).
52
Medical News Today, Pfizer Signs Agreement with Shanghai Government to Enhance Protection
of Patients, May 19, 2004, http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/8476.php.
53
See Hu & Gomez, supra note 9.
54
See Lutter, supra note 47.
55
See Pitts, supra note 20.
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shut down 461 Chinese pharmaceutical factories between January and
November of 2005 alone.56
The Chinese state government’s efforts to more closely regulate IPR
through increased investigation and litigation demonstrates its willingness to
improve its national IP climate.57 To further effectuate this goal, as detailed
below, China has joined several international IP organizations and signed
various international treaties.
C.

China Complies with the Express Requirements of Various
International IP Agreements

In recent years, the Chinese national government has communicated a
strong desire to encourage innovation through increased enforcement of
IPR.58 During this time, China has joined international organizations and
signed several treaties in order to solidify its position in the global IP
market.59
However, China has continuously struggled to meet the
requirements of these international instruments.60
After joining WIPO in 1980,61 China continued its efforts towards
becoming a participant in the international IP market by joining the Paris
Convention on Industrial Property in March of 1985 and signing the Patent
Cooperation Treaty in 1994.62 Additionally, in 1990, China agreed to
register all trademarks with the International Bureau of WIPO through its
accession to the Madrid Trademark Agreement.63 Finally, on December 1,
2001, China officially became a member of the World Trade Organization
(“WTO”)64 and, at this time, became subject to requirements laid out in the

56

Id.
See Kristy Barnes, China Drug Safety Crackdown Continues, PACKWIRE, Nov. 6, 2007,
http://www.packwire.com/news/ng.asp?n=77257-china-drug-safety-regulation.
58
See Jiang Zhipei, Recent Developments in China’s Judicial Protection of Intellectual Property
Rights, Address at Temple University Law School (Aug. 18, 2008), available at
http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/english/forum/forum43.htm. See also U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supra
note 15, at 7.
59
See Andrew Evans, Note, Taming the Counterfeit Dragon: The WTO, TRIPS and Chinese
Amendments to Intellectual Property Laws, 31 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 587, 587-88 (2003).
60
See Iyengar, supra note 4.
61
See Jessica Wong, The Challenges Multinational Corporations Face in Protecting Their WellKnown Trademarks, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 937, 943 (2006). WIPO is a specialized agency of the United
Nations, dedicated to the development of an accessible and balanced international IP system. See WIPO,
What is WIPO?, http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/what_is_wipo.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2007).
62
See Wong, supra note 61, at 943.
63
Id.
64
See generally World Trade Organization [WTO], Protocol on Accession of the People's Republic
of China, WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001).
57
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Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(“TRIPS”).65
China has amended its IP laws and regulations several times in order
to comply with requirements of these international agreements; however, it
continues to struggle to make the requisite changes to its administrative and
judicial bodies. Specifically, as discussed in further detail below, although
the applicable laws have been altered to meet international requirements,
China continues to lack full implementation of such laws.66 TRIPS requires
WTO members to protect IPR by promulgating laws that are stringent
enough to deter people from engaging in infringement.67 However, it is
debatable whether China has promulgated appropriate law and policy to
effectuate this required deterrent effect.68 In order to assess this issue, it is
first helpful to consider the actual requirements laid out in the TRIPS
agreement.
Article 41(1) of TRIPS mandates that the legal consequences of IP
infringement “constitute a deterrent to further infringements.”69 This is an
important specification of the agreement because it places a significant
burden on WTO members to take adequate legal action against IP
infringement within its borders. This article does not lay out specific
penalties that would “constitute a deterrent,” and, therefore, it is not
necessarily clear whether a specific country has met the standards required
under TRIPS.
Article 45 of TRIPS mandates that damages in cases of infringement
sufficiently remedy the right holder’s injury and should be calculated based
on the expense incurred by the patent holder and subsequent profits lost due
to lacking sales of the genuine product.70 Additionally, Article 61 of TRIPS
requires that members provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be
applied “at least in cases of willful trademark counterfeiting . . . on a
commercial scale.”71 Because WTO does not define “on a commercial
65

See Veronica Weinstein & Dennis Fernandez, WTO Pushes China Toward Greater IP Protection,
LARTA INST. VOX, July 12, 2004, http://www.larta.org/lavox/articlelinks/2004/040712_wto.asp.
66
Trade with China: Hearing on U.S. Trade with China Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the H.
Comm. on Ways and Means, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Geralyn Ritter, Vice President, International
Affairs
Pharmaceutical
Research
and
Manufacturers
Association),
available
at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=view&id=5458.
67
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 61, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments--Results
of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS] (setting forth general provisions,
enforcement of and standards concerning IP rights).
68
SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 17, at 19.
69
TRIPS, supra note 67, art. 41.
70
See id. art. 45.
71
Id. art. 61.
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scale,” this language gives member states discretion in determining what
amount meets this requirement.
Despite possible ambiguities in these articles, TRIPS has played an
important role in shaping Chinese IP law. Currently, most observers
consider Chinese standards to comply with TRIPS.72 However, despite such
compliance, the production and sale of counterfeit drugs has not diminished
in China due to weak enforcement and deterrence mechanisms in domestic
law.73 An assessment of the Chinese IP laws used to protect rights holders
from counterfeiting sheds light on this problem.
III.

COUNTERFEIT PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTION AND SALE VIOLATES
CHINESE PATENT AND TRADEMARK LAWS

Individuals or corporations engaged in the production or sale of
counterfeit pharmaceuticals in China may be charged with the violation of
multiple laws, including those related to IP infringement, pharmaceutical
regulations, laws against unfair competition, and custom protections.74
Parties harmed by the production or sale of counterfeit pharmaceuticals can
also bring an infringement claim under trademark or patent law.75 If a
person wishes to bring an action against a counterfeiter, these IP laws
provide an avenue through which administrative, civil, or criminal action
can be taken.76
A.

Businesses That Deal in Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals Are Infringing
Chinese Patent Law

If an individual or corporation produces a counterfeit
pharmaceutical—one containing active ingredients or substances that are
patented under Chinese law—the patent holder can bring a legal action
against the manufacturer, seller, or importer of that counterfeit drug.77 Such
action can be brought through an administrative authority or by an action in

72
See Counterfeiting in China: Roundtable on Intellectual Property Protection as Economic Policy:
Will China Ever Enforce Its IP Laws? Before the Cong.-Exec. Comm. on China (May 16, 2005) (statement
of Daniel Chow, Professor, Ohio State University Michael E. Moritz College of Law), available at
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/roundtables/051605/index.php.
73
Id.
74
See Hilboldt, supra note 13, at 872.
75
Id.
76
See generally id. (describing different types of laws violated when counterfeiting takes place);
U.S. Dep’t. of Comm. Int. Trade Admin., supra note 7.
77
See Hilboldt, supra note 13, at 873.
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the people’s court.78 Patent infringement actions in China are brought to the
intermediate people’s court and can be appealed to the Supreme People’s
Court,79 whose decision is final.80 These cases are matters of both civil and
criminal law and proceedings can be instituted following a complaint by the
patentee, a prosecutor, or the court itself.81
China’s first Patent Law, enacted in 1984, was amended in both 1992
and 2000 to extend the scope of patent protection and to comply with
international agreements and treaties.82 Unlike the United States’ patent
system, which gives patent rights to the first inventor, China follows a firstto-file system,83 established under Article 9 of the Patent Law.84 This means
that patent rights are not necessarily granted to the first party to invent, but
to the first party who files the invention; a different party often beats the
inventor in this process.85 Additionally, a foreign patent application must be
filed through an authorized Chinese patent agent unless the filing person or
firm has a business office in China.86 This arguably makes patent filing
more difficult for international competitors because they may have limited
access to Chinese patent lawyers and information regarding current Chinese
innovation.
Counterfeiters can be found guilty of violating Article 60 of China’s
Patent Law which states that a patentee can institute a legal proceeding
against an infringee when that infringee “exploit[s a] patent without the
authorization of the patentee.”87 Articles 57 through 62 address the legal
proceedings and damages that follow such infringement.88 These articles are
discussed in greater detail below.
Because individual patents proscribe IP ownership of the active
substances used to produce pharmaceuticals, the current Patent Law directly
implicates the counterfeit market. Assuming that IP laws are adequately
78

Ladas & Parry, LLP, Patent Litigation in China: Scope of Patent Protection,
http://www.ladas.com/Litigation/ForeignPatentLitigation/ChinaPR_Patent_Litigation.html (last visited
Nov. 11, 2007).
79
The Supreme People’s Court is the highest judicial organ in China. For more information on the
Supreme People’s Court, see ADB OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific, Governmental
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enforced, counterfeiters cannot appropriate protected inventions from
legitimate inventors without legal repercussions. Specifically, the Patent
Law provides infringees with a legal mechanism through which they can
protect their IPR and recover damages when infringement occurs.
B.

Pharmaceutical Counterfeiters in China Violate Chinese Trademark
Law

Individuals or corporations may have a counterfeiting trademark claim
if the product or trade dress—including the context of a label of the
counterfeit product—is identical, or confusingly similar in appearance, to
that of the authentic product.89 The first Chinese Trademark Law was
adopted in 1982 and revised in both 1993 and 2001.90 The development of
China’s Trademark Law has amounted to a continuous effort to comply with
requirements laid out in TRIPS.91 Specifically, over time, the Trademark
Law extended registration to include collective marks, certification marks,
and three-dimensional symbols.92 Also, the highest adjudicative power in
cases of infringement was transferred from an administrative to a judicial
mechanism.93
Article 52 of the Trademark Law lists five specific acts that are
considered trademark infringements.94 Among other acts, these include
selling goods that “bear a counterfeited registered trademark” and
counterfeiting, making, or selling a registered trademark of another person
without authorization or representation.95
Like the Patent Law, China’s Trademark Law requires all foreign
companies to register their trademarks through a Chinese trademark agent
and in a Chinese language version.96 Also, as under its patent law, China has
a first-to-file system for trademarks.97 This system does not require
evidence of prior use or ownership and thus allows third parties to register
89
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popular foreign marks.98 Local third parties, called trademark pirates, can
thus gain rights over foreign popular marks and reap significant profits from
the foreign trademark holders’ international popularity.99 This is especially
beneficial to pharmaceutical counterfeiters, who can take advantage of
parties holding popular marks that are unable to find IP protection in China.
China has responded to this problem by promulgating laws to protect
what are considered “well-known” marks.100 Under Article 2 of the
Provisions on the Determination and Protection of Well-Known Marks, “a
well-known mark refers to a mark that is widely known to the relevant
sectors of the public and enjoys a relatively high reputation in China.”101
Article 14 of China’s Trademark Law lays out five factors that the courts
should consider when deciding whether something is or is not a well-known
mark.102 Also, under Article 13 the legal owner of a mark that is not
registered in China but is well-known there may bring a claim of opposition
or cancellation against the previously registered mark.103
As under patent law, trademark rights holders can utilize these
provisions to protect themselves from infringement. Counterfeiters violating
trademark rights create illegitimate drugs and package them using a wellknown mark.104 This allows them to sell the cheaply-produced product at
the legitimate drug’s market value, significantly reducing the trademark
holder’s profits. Trademark law provides a legal mechanism through which
infringees can stop such infringement and recover damages for lost profits.
IV.

THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM DOES NOT EFFECTIVELY DETER
PHARMACEUTICAL COUNTERFEITERS FROM ENTERING THE DRUG
MARKET

Despite the existence of legal mechanisms for stopping IP
infringement, enforcement of Chinese IP law is insufficient for several
reasons. First, current Chinese IP law and methods of enforcement do not
mandate strong enough punishments to deter counterfeiters from continuing
98
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to infringe IPR.105 Second, local autonomy has led to corruption in both the
local government and the judiciary, causing an overall lack of enforcement
of existing IP law. Third, inadequate judicial transparency and independence
further hinders enforcement. Fourth, there are insufficient resources
allocated to fighting drug counterfeiting in both the judicial and
administrative sectors.
A.

Current Administrative, Civil, and Criminal Enforcement of IPR Does
Not Deter Parties from Engaging in Counterfeiting

The Patent and Trademark Laws, by their express terms, provide
protection from IP infringement and thus pharmaceutical counterfeiting. In
China, these laws are enforced either through an administrative mechanism
or through adjudication, including both civil and criminal action.106
However, it is arguable whether such laws effectively deter parties from
engaging in pharmaceutical counterfeiting. According to general deterrence
theory, individuals will engage in criminal activities if they do not have a
rational reason to fear punishment.107 Under this theory, parties who are
aware of increased punishment will alter their decision-making process and
may choose not to engage in a given crime.108 This theory, applied to drug
counterfeiters in China, supports the argument that parties will continue to
engage in counterfeiting as long as they are not adequately deterred from
doing so.
1.

The Administrative Mechanism Is Most Often Used to Enforce IPR but
Is Inadequate to Fight Drug Counterfeiting

The administrative mechanism is the most utilized method of dealing
with the drug counterfeiting problem in China today.109 Specifically, the
trademark office under China’s State Administration on Agency and
Commerce (“SAIC”) is responsible for the enforcement of trademark
protection,110 whereas SIPO is responsible for enforcement of patent
rights.111
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SIPO is responsible for granting all patents and administratively
enforcing them in provisional offices.112 This enforcement includes
investigating, mediating, providing cease and desist orders, and imposing
fines in infringement cases.113 Under Article 57 of the Patent Law, if
infringement of a patent right occurs “the patentee or any interested party
may either bring a lawsuit to the people’s court, or request the patent
administrative department, for settlement.”114 The administrative authorities
for patent affairs have the power to order the infringer to immediately cease
any acts of infringement.115 Any party who is dissatisfied with such an order
may, within 15 days of receiving notification, file a suit in the people’s court
in accordance with Chinese Administrative Litigation Law.116 Under Article
62, there is a two-year statute of limitations for filing a patent infringement
suit, beginning on the day the patentee or the interested parties become
aware, or should have become aware, of the act of infringement.117 If a suit
is filed within the statute of limitations, and if the circumstances constitute a
crime, the person deemed responsible shall be investigated for criminal
liability under Article 216 of the Criminal Law.118
Alternately, SAIC has authority over trademark registration,
recognition of well-known marks, and enforcement of trademark
protection.119 SAIC applies the Trademark Law to protect against IP
infringement arising from drug counterfeiting.120 Article 53 of China’s
Trademark Law states that “the interested parties shall resolve the dispute
through consultation,” and if they cannot do so, “the trademark registrant or
interested party may institute legal proceedings in the [p]eople’s [c]ourt.”121
Both SIPO and SAIC have investigative power and the ability to render
punishment when infringement is determined.122 Specifically, each can
enjoin an infringer from continuing production, mandate the destruction of
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infringing marks or products, impose fines, and remove machines used to
produce counterfeit goods.123
While these agencies may choose to pass cases along to the judicial
sector for either civil or criminal action instead of dealing with them
internally,124 such judicial action is not often utilized due mainly to the
reluctance of administrative authorities to forward cases to the criminal
authorities.125 Furthermore, infringees are also reluctant to bring an action
directly to the judiciary for criminal investigation.126 This reluctance
partially results from influential Chinese cultural ideals centered on
collective societal welfare.127 Such emphasis on collective welfare results in
a decrease in use of the adversarial system of litigation.128 Also, both the
concept of litigation and IP law are relatively new to the Chinese legal
system, thus many parties do not choose this route due to their lack of
knowledge or experience of the system.129 For these reasons, most IP
infringement cases remain in the administrative system.130
Administrative agencies arguably do not effectively protect IPR
holders. Though legally empowered to enforce decisions, administrative
agencies cannot award compensation to the IPR holders in most cases.131
The harmed infringee, who may have suffered great financial harm due to
the infringement, is therefore left without monetary redress. And, while
agencies do have the power to fine the infringer and seize goods and
equipment used in manufacturing infringing products,132 these mechanisms
are not very effective due to the shortage of available financial resources and
trained staff to carry out enforcement.133 In China, local governments
provide the financing necessary to run administrative agencies
successfully.134 However, these governments may be reluctant to provide
adequate funding for IP enforcement because it is financially beneficial for
them to allow pharmaceutical counterfeiting to flourish in the local
123
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economies.135 Due to the lack of available resources and adequate
enforcement, administrative bodies are not likely to effectively fight against
IP infringement or to deter parties from entering into the counterfeit drug
market.
2.

Civil Action Does Not Effectively Deter Drug Counterfeiters from
Entering the Market

Like the threat of administrative action, penalties incurred as a result
of civil litigation are arguably not effective at deterring counterfeiters. In
China, there has been a steady increase in private civil proceedings focused
on IP infringement. For example, the number of civil IP cases initiated in
Chinese courts grew from 5265 in 2001 to 7800 in 2002.136 Still, despite the
increased involvement of the judiciary in cases of IP infringement, there has
been little impact on the production of counterfeit drugs in China. This is
due largely to the fact that even when cases are tried, the resulting
punishment is too insignificant to cause real deterrent effects.137 Article 58
of the Patent Law restricts fines to no more than three times the infringer’s
income, and Article 60 indicates that either the losses suffered by the
patentee or the infringer’s profits should be used to calculate damages.138
Further, under Article 56 of China’s Trademark Law, the amount of damages
for infringement is the profit the infringer has earned or the injury the
infringee has suffered from that infringement, including the expenses spent
by the infringee to stop the infringement.139 Where this amount is difficult
to determine, the people’s court imposes an amount of damages not
exceeding RMB 500,000 (approximately U.S. $62,500).140
These limitations likely protect infringers who could otherwise be
saddled with very large damage payments depending on the method of
calculation employed by the court. Furthermore, because the amount set
under Article 56 is merely a maximum, the actual fine imposed is often
much lower. For example, the average fine imposed on counterfeiters in
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2000 was $794, and the average compensation to infringees was $19.141
This amount is not even increased for mass production infringers who have
the ability to earn colossal profits and cause massive harm to scores of
people.142 In fact, because counterfeiters have the potential to gain
enormous profits, such low penalties are often considered a mere fiscal
speed bump in doing business and thus do not cause potential counterfeiters
to change course.143
In addition to the fact that such provisions regarding damages may
leave the law ineffective in deterring future infringement, it is debatable
whether the fines currently imposed under Chinese law satisfy the TRIPS
deterrence requirement. Again, TRIPS does not provide specific guidelines
for fines imposed on counterfeiters and therefore does not provide any
binding international norms that member nations must follow when
sanctioning counterfeiters. Article 45 of TRIPS requires that damages
provide “adequate” compensation to the rights holder.144 However, it does
not clarify what remedy would meet this requirement. Under a typical case
of IP infringement, the potential harm caused to a rights holder could include
the loss of his or her entire business and all assets tied to such business. This
type of damage is not likely to be remedied by providing compensation
equal to the production costs and price of the genuine product. It could be
argued that it is therefore not “adequate,” and thus that existing remedies
under Chinese law are not in compliance with the requirements of TRIPS.
The problem of insufficient redress in cases of IP infringement is
further complicated by the fact that civil cases are not adjudicated equally
for all IP players. According to China’s Civil Procedure Act, civil cases are
usually handled within six months from the filing date.145 Yet foreign parties
are not protected by this law and therefore their cases may take years to
adjudicate.146 During this time, thousands of counterfeit drugs could
continue to circulate in the Chinese drug market, resulting in inadequate
legal relief for an aggrieved foreign party.147
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Chinese Criminal Law Is Inadequate to Deter Pharmaceutical
Counterfeiters

Like its administrative and civil counterparts, Chinese criminal law is
inadequate to deter IP infringement. Under TRIPS, all member countries are
required to provide for criminal procedures and penalties in cases of
pharmaceutical counterfeiting.148 Even though China has formally complied
with this provision, simply providing for the possibility of criminal
prosecution does not ensure adequate enforcement. In 2000, only about one
in five-hundred cases were referred from the administrative to the judicial
authorities for criminal prosecution, and this number has not significantly
increased over time.149
Chinese criminal law is arguably insufficient to deter individuals from
engaging in pharmaceutical counterfeiting. Article 213 of the Criminal Law
deals with counterfeiting trademarks.150 This provision is only utilized
when, according to Article 59 of the Trademark Law, “the case is so serious
as to constitute a crime.”151 Under Article 59, when a case is “serious
enough,” criminal prosecution shall follow, in addition to compensation for
the damages suffered by the infringee.152 The literal reading of this language
implies that IP infringement and criminality can be mutually exclusive under
the law.153 The circular assertion that something which constitutes a serious
crime is a crime arguably creates space for vast judicial discretion to decide
whether or not a counterfeiter should face criminal liability.154 This
distinction can cause failures in the enforcement against counterfeiting
because courts may refrain from imposing criminal sanctions due to the
pressure they receive from local governments.155
If the case is considered serious enough to constitute a crime, Article
213 and 216 of the Criminal Law may be applied.156 The maximum allotted
prison sentence under the Criminal Law is not more than three years when
the “circumstances are serious.”157 Under this law, it is up to the judge to
decide what constitutes a “serious circumstance,” and because there is no
148
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minimum length of imprisonment mandated, the judge could arguably
choose to give a minimal prison sentence or no prison sentence at all for
counterfeit convictions.158 The same maximum prison sentence is allotted
under Article 214 for someone who knowingly sells merchandise under a
counterfeit trademark and under Article 215 for someone who is forging,
manufacturing, or selling without authority another’s registered
trademarks.159 Similarly, under Article 216, a maximum of three years
imprisonment is provided for an individual who “counterfeits other people’s
patents.”160 Again, there is judicial discretion as to which offense should
incur this maximum sentence and how long the prison terms should run.
Armed with this discretion, judges may choose to impose very low
sentences for patent-related counterfeiting. Further, even if a judge did wish
to impose a higher sanction, he or she would be bound by the low cap of
three years.161 In a very limited exception under Article 214, this time of
imprisonment can be extended up to seven years for cases where there is a
significantly large amount of sales.162 However, this exception is rarely
utilized because judges tend to avoid holding that a huge sales volume has
been produced or sold in reaction to pressure from local governments that
want to protect their interests in the counterfeit drug market.163 The resulting
prison terms prescribed for counterfeiting crimes are frequently too low to
deter parties from engaging in counterfeit drug production and sale.164
Furthermore, even when judges do attempt to hand down harsher
penalties for violations of IP law, they struggle to find and apply the
appropriate law governing infringement.165
Because local people’s
congresses have the power to promulgate new laws and regulations to
address IPR, and there is no formal communication system between the
various Chinese localities, the applicable law is often inconsistent and
ambiguous.166 This inconsistency arguably encourages counterfeiters to
relocate to areas governed by less stringent laws, as they may receive better
158
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treatment from courts sitting in certain localities, which in turn likely drowns
those courts in IP litigation. This problem has partially been alleviated with
China’s obligations under TRIPS, however significant variance in legal
interpretation remains, making protection of IPR inconsistent.167
B.

Local Autonomy Has Led to Corruption and Strong Local Support for
the Counterfeit Pharmaceutical Market

Due to the inconsistency and lack of enforcement of IP law,
strengthening the current law alone would likely not be sufficient to deter
the production of counterfeit drugs. Regardless of the remedies tied to the
infringement of IPR, the final decision of which mark to protect or which
patent right to uphold is left in the hands of subjective local courts and
administrative agencies.168 Therefore, in order to assess the effectiveness of
amending current IP law it is important to consider the forces that influence
the judiciary’s decisions in cases of drug counterfeiting.
Insufficient enforcement of the law, caused by local protectionism of
drug counterfeiting, has arguably decreased even the low deterrent effect
that current legal mechanisms provide. Based on its actions and statements,
the central government in China has indicated a dedication to the protection
of IPR.169 However, this central level authority is comprised mainly of
legislative and policy-making bodies, while actual implementation and
enforcement of law occurs at the local level.170 In recent years, there has
been an increased trend towards solidifying local autonomy in China.171
This exertion has resulted in localism—the emergence of administrative
bureaucracy in regions across China.172 As a result, Beijing’s central power
has eroded due to the formation of regional concentrations of power.173
Although these localities must report to the central Chinese government,
they have developed significant independence and autonomy over their own
geographic areas, developing their own mini-economies, laws, and
government power.
The growth of localism seriously affected the stability of the
counterfeit pharmaceutical market in China. Specifically, local autonomy
167
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has led to the corruption of local officials, who may accept kickbacks and
bribes in exchange for either ignoring the counterfeiting activity in their
localities or becoming active participants in the counterfeit business
themselves.174 Many of these local officials significantly benefit from the
financial benefits associated with counterfeiting and therefore have a strong
incentive to support continued production.175
Furthermore, local governments and communities also benefit
indirectly from the counterfeit drug market.
In many localities,
counterfeiters significantly contribute to the local market through the use of
transportation, restaurants, and hotels.176 In some regions, the counterfeit
market is so intertwined with the legitimate local market that it has become
nearly impossible to distinguish the counterfeit from the legitimate
businesses.177 In such areas, shutting down counterfeit production might
seriously impact the local economy due to reliance on the counterfeiters’
financial investment in the area.178 Over time, such localism has given both
government and local businesses strong incentive to support the counterfeit
drug market. This structure of support makes IPR enforcement difficult
because the judiciary lacks adequate independence from local officials and
therefore tends not to render decisions that significantly harm the local
counterfeit market.179
C.

The Lack of Judicial Transparency and Independence in China
Exacerbates the Counterfeiting Problem

In addition to the growth of localism in China, the lack of judicial
independence in China significantly hampers IPR enforcement.180 The
Chinese Constitution grants the people’s court power of independent
adjudication;181 however, in practice, the courts are reliant on the Chinese
government in many aspects.182 There is a growing relationship between the
local courts and other components of the local political system which not
only hinders judicial independence but has given rise to local
174
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protectionism.183 In fact, many leaders of Chinese local governments view
courts simply as “subordinate departments of the local government.”184
Under such local protectionism, judges tend to bias their decisions in
favor of parties supported by local committees or local people’s
congresses.185 Chinese judges are especially affected by this pressure
because they do not have tenure and, therefore, are subject to loss of benefits
or even removal if they render a verdict that is disfavored by the local
government.186 Additionally, local courts may suffer from significant
funding reductions if they do not take government interests seriously.187
This lack of independence has a significant impact on the prosecution of
pharmaceutical counterfeiters.
This issue is magnified by the lack of transparency within the
judiciary itself, and the great potential for judicial corruption. The status and
salaries of judges are low.188 Meanwhile, the large amounts of money and
property at stake in disputes involving counterfeiting create an added risk of
corruption.189 This, coupled with the shortage of adequately trained judges
and lawyers,190 allows for the possibility of serious unethical or
unprofessional conduct.191 Thus, judges may be more likely to take a bribe
from a counterfeiter in exchange for a more favorable ruling in an infringer’s
favor, adding to the levels of corruption revolving around the counterfeit
market.
D.

A Significant Shortage of Resources Available to Address IP
Infringement in China Encourages Growth in Counterfeiting

Both the administrative and judicial spheres in China lack the
resources necessary to impact pharmaceutical counterfeiting.192 The Chinese
government is responsible for providing funding and other resources to fight
against the production and sale of counterfeit drugs and has publicly
announced its intention to increase such efforts.193 However, there are
insufficient funds, personnel, and government resources allocated to attack
183
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the counterfeiting problem, and the current levels of resources are only
likely to decline.
Again, the administrative mechanism of either SIPO or SAIC handles
most cases of IP infringement in China.194 However, these agencies are also
responsible for determining whether IPR should be granted in the first
place.195 Due to the influx of parties seeking to obtain IPR, these
organizations allocate a significant portion of their budgets and personnel to
reading and reviewing patent and trademark applications and thus have
limited resources remaining to handle the investigation and adjudication of
infringement claims.
Absent increased funding for enforcement purposes, China’s growing
involvement in the IP market is likely to lead to further depletions in
government resources. For example, SIPO is already experiencing a
resource crunch due to a large increase in patent filings. A report produced
by WIPO shows a 488% increase in patent applications in China since
1995.196 More troubling are figures released in 2006 that reveal that more
than 90% of Chinese companies have no experience with IPR and have
never submitted a patent to SIPO.197 As the trend towards protection of
innovation grows in China, many of these companies may apply for IP
protection to keep up with their competitors, causing SIPO to become
overloaded and unable to handle patent infringement cases.198 SAIC is
likely to experience similar issues with the increase of trademark filings and
the simultaneous growth of IP infringement claims.199
Similar budget constraints exist in the judiciary. The courts are often
unable to deal with counterfeiting actions effectively due to the lack of
resources allocated for such adjudication. This resource crunch is further
frustrated by judicial inefficiency caused by lack of training. IP law is
relatively new in China and neither judges, prosecutors, nor defense counsel
are properly trained to adjudicate cases of IP infringement.200 This arguably
decreases the speed of adjudication and thus increases overall cost.
Furthermore, as in the administrative sector, if IP infringement litigation
becomes more frequent and the government does not increase the courts’
194
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budgets, the judiciary will likely not be able to carry such a large load of
cases, possibly causing infringees to suffer from additional losses during
lengthy litigation.
V.

CHINA SHOULD TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS TO FIGHT COUNTERFEITING
BY CLARIFYING EXISTING LAW AND FIGHTING CORRUPTION AT ITS
SOURCE

As described above, many IP infringement cases currently remain to
be tried in the administrative sector. Even when transferred to the judiciary,
infringement is treated as a crime only if the presiding judge deems the case
to be “serious” enough to warrant such penalties.201 This discretion often
leads to lenient enforcement because judges tend to avoid rendering harsh
decisions due to internal corruption or as a reaction to pressure from local
government officials seeking to protect their own stake in the counterfeit
market.202 Two main steps could be taken to improve the current
counterfeiting situation in China. First, fines should be increased, and
enforcement mechanisms should be strengthened to ensure future deterrence
of IP infringement.203 Second, an agency should be created to monitor the
judiciary and local government officials, investigate counterfeiting activities,
and educate the public regarding the negative implications of counterfeiting.
A.

Chinese Laws Should Be Amended to Increase Fines and Prison
Terms Imposed on Pharmaceutical Counterfeiters

China’s ineffective battle against counterfeiting stems partially from
the insufficient punishment described above.
Specifically, the low
maximum fines and imprisonment terms prescribed by civil and criminal
laws are slight punishments when compared to the enormous profits a party
can acquire through counterfeiting.204 These laws should therefore be
amended to increase administrative and criminal sanctions to levels high
enough to ensure that the risk of counterfeiting outweighs possible profits
earned by the production or sale of counterfeit pharmaceuticals. As a matter
of general deterrence, counterfeiters will rationally weigh this increased
severity of punishment when deciding whether to enter the counterfeit
market, and with more stringent punishment, many will be deterred from
doing so.
201
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First, a specific provision should be added to both the Patent Law and
the Trademark Law stating that producing or selling counterfeit drugs is a
crime and will be tried as such.205 Classifying counterfeiting drugs as a
crime would diminish judicial discretion in the determination of whether
specific cases should be deemed criminal, because all counterfeiting cases
would automatically be considered “serious” enough to constitute a crime.
Second, in order for a criminal classification of counterfeiting to result
in significant deterrence, the fines and prison terms mandated for such
crimes should be increased.206 If counterfeiters face increased fines and
prolonged prison terms, they are less likely to enter the counterfeiting
market and more likely to cease current production to avoid such
punishment. Classifying acts of drug counterfeiting as a crime would
arguably lead to increased judicial involvement in the enforcement of IPR,
as all such criminal proceedings would be automatically transferred to the
judicial branch.
In order to deal with this growing problem, the Chinese central
government must make additional funds available to combat counterfeiting.
Funding must not only be provided for adjudicatory proceedings, but also
for the police, who must be properly trained in methods used to trace and
effectively confiscate and destroy counterfeit drugs.207 In order to provide
such funding, the Chinese government should create a fund comprised of the
confiscated profits from convicted counterfeiters. A large portion of these
profits would go to the infringee in the form of damages and/or to support
victims’ healthcare costs, and a certain portion could be allocated amongst
the various entities working to fight against pharmaceutical counterfeiting in
order to fund their efforts.
B.

A Designated Anti-Corruption Agency Could Decrease Corruption
and Increase Enforcement

In order to protect IPR and decrease counterfeiting, China should
address the problem of protectionism from its source at the local level.
Although amending Chinese law and providing resources for judicial action
are two important steps towards adequate IPR protection, levels of Chinese
pharmaceutical counterfeiting will probably not diminish as long as local
205
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government officials bar effective adjudication and enforcement.208
Specifically, China should create an agency solely designed to fight the
corruption associated with counterfeit pharmaceutical production and sale.
Currently, an anti-corruption agency—the Independent Commission
Against Corruption (“ICAC”)—operates in Hong Kong. The ICAC is
charged with fighting general corruption in Hong Kong.209 This agency
could be used as a model for an anti-corruption agency targeting the
pharmaceutical industry. The ICAC uses a three-prong approach consisting
of deterrence, prevention, and education that has proven to be relatively
successful at fighting some types of corruption in Hong Kong.210 The ICAC
can, after obtaining a court order, scrutinize bank accounts and execute
search warrants, as well as run major prevention and education
campaigns.211
Although the ICAC reveals China’s strong anti-corruption sentiment,
it alone is inadequate to fight against corruption relating to pharmaceutical
counterfeiting. Agents working at the ICAC do not have the requisite
expertise on counterfeiting and IP laws to address the complex issues
associated with the counterfeit market. Additionally, the ICAC’s powers do
not reach beyond its local boundaries because it is located exclusively in
Hong Kong, whereas pharmaceutical counterfeiting spreads across localities
and borders. Furthermore, because corruption associated with drug
counterfeiting is vast, the ICAC likely does not have adequate resources to
attack the problem effectively. For these reasons, an anti-corruption agency
targeted specifically at fighting corruption related to drug counterfeiting
should be established in China.
Unlike the ICAC, a new anti-corruption agency should be established
with multiple offices in different regions in order to address corruption at the
local level effectively. Because counterfeiting-related corruption is unique
in each locality, each local anti-corruption department should be made up of
highly trained and experienced agents capable of tackling counterfeiting in
that specific region. Each office should be required to report to a central
location monitored by the national Chinese government to ensure that
208
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employees at each locality do not become involved in local corruption
themselves. The central office should then be required to report to the WTO,
which would monitor compliance with TRIPS requirements. This would, in
turn, likely lead to increased international confidence in Chinese IPR
enforcement.
Similar to the ICAC’s power to obtain warrants, this anti-corruption
agency should be vested with investigative and auditing powers212 in order
to ensure that local government officials, judges, and lawyers do not take
bribes from counterfeit producers and sellers. Further, like the ICAC, this
agency should educate the public on drug counterfeiting and should establish
a public complaint system through which citizens can report incidents of
counterfeiting.213 Such efforts have proven to be successful in the ICAC’s
fight against corruption214 and would arguably have a similar effect on the
counterfeit-pharmaceutical industry.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Although China has taken several important steps to gain the
confidence of the international community, its current enforcement of IPR
remains inadequate to deter individuals from entering the counterfeit
pharmaceutical market. In order to improve enforcement, the Chinese
government should amend its laws to include higher financial sanctions and
longer prison terms to deter counterfeiters. It should also funnel more
resources into the judicial sector so it can better deal with infringement
actions. Simultaneously, China should attack corruption at the local level by
setting up an agency targeted at corruption associated with pharmaceutical
counterfeiting. Targeting local corruption and amending applicable law will
allow for increased enforcement and, with time, will likely deter
counterfeiters from entering the market.
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